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Necessary but not automatic: How Europe learnt to integrate  
 
 
N. Piers Ludlow 
 
With over sixty years of history behind it, the process of regional integration in 
Europe has lasted longer, and gone further, than that seen in any other part of the 
world.  The instinct therefore to look to the European example as a case-study of 
integration, from which other regions might derive both positive and negative lessons 
is both strong and comprehensible.  But as this chapter will seek to emphasise, the 
European advance to regional integration has been the product of very specific 
historical circumstances.  While there may therefore be some useful insights that can 
be gained from looking at the European process from the outside and seeking to 
identify some of the factors that have helped to drive it onward, any attempt to draw 
hard and fast lessons from the European story, or to assume any automatic parallels 
between the pattern of development observed and that likely to occur elsewhere, 
would be unwise.  Europe has taken a very distinctive European road to that level of 
unity that it has so far obtained; other regions, to the extent that they too want and 
need to develop patterns of cooperation, are always likely to follow somewhat 
different paths.  The bulk of this chapter will hence confine itself to trying to analyse 
what happened in Europe to create and sustain the EC/EU, before, very tentatively, 
suggesting a handful of conclusions that might be derived from this European process 
that could have some relevance elsewhere. 
 
Two underlying imperatives 
Europe has long been a densely populated but highly divided region, holding within it 
a multiplicity of states, nations, languages, cultures, ethnic and religious groups, and 
social classes.  The potential for the inevitable rivalry and friction between and 
amongst these different groupings to break out into actual war has hence always been 
there.  But whereas the 18
th
 Century British historian, Edward Gibbon, could regard 
such periodic outbursts of violence as a healthy tonic and spur to development, a 
characteristic of Europe that helped keep its rulers alert and to prevent its populations 
from slipping into damaging torpor or complacency, the effects of war since Gibbon’s 
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time have been rather harder to view in a positive light.
1
  The destructiveness of the 
two great wars of the Twentieth Century in particular, was so great, whether measured 
in terms of those killed and wounded, the physical impact on the landscape of the 
continent, the political or economic disruption caused, or the damage done to 
Europe’s standing in the world, that a need to avert future large-scale conflict has 
become almost self-evident.  The first underlying imperative that encouraged many 
politicians and political thinkers to start contemplating some form of European unity 
has thus been the need to avoid war and to preserve peace within Europe, thereby 
avoiding the cataclysms that had marked the 1914 to 1945 period.
2
 
 Equally important has been a second underlying imperative, namely the extent 
of European interdependence in terms of what it ate, what it produced, and what it 
sold.  Here too some of the basic realities have been obvious for centuries: Europe has 
been, ever since the Middle Ages if not earlier still, a region the prosperity of which 
has been built on extensive economic intercourse between different parts of the 
continent (and beyond).  But such economic interaction has always been vulnerable 
not just to actual conflict, but also to the state-building processes of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Thus the historian Carl Strickwerda has written convincingly 
about the extraordinary level of interdependence, in capital, in labour, and in trade, 
that grew up in Europe’s heavy industry in the latter part of the 19th century and the 
first part of the 20
th
, only for this interpenetration to be swept aside by the outbreak of 
the First World War.
3
  Similarly, in a famous passage of his celebrated denunciation 
of the Versailles Treaty, John Maynard Keynes described the fashion in which the 
destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its replacement with multiple, new 
and separate states, was likely to destroy patterns of economic interaction which had 
developed over the centuries and upon which much of the prosperity of the region 
relied.
4
  The underlying realities of how Europe fed itself, how it produced its goods, 
and where it sold the output of its factories and workshops, thus led some thinkers and 
statesmen to the realisation that the political separation of the continent into largely 
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autonomous sovereign entities, unwilling or unable to open themselves up fully to 
intra-European trade, came at a high economic cost.  The solution once more would 
be to soften such divisions by establishing some type of over-arching European 
framework which would facilitate commerce between different parts of the continent.
5
 
 Importantly, however, the presence of such ideas did not lead automatically to 
the realisation of a united Europe.  On the contrary, in interwar Europe in particular, 
those voices raised in favour of building Europe so as to preserve peace and to allow 
Europe’s economic interdependence to be exploited, were all but drowned out by the 
more powerful calls in favour of national or imperial self-reliance.  The imperatives 
for unity were present in the Europe of 1918 to 1939, in other words.  But far from 
shaping the course of events, they were instead disregarded as the states of the 
European system tumbled into economic nationalism, autocracy, and ultimately war.   
 
A favourable postwar context 
It would thus take the particular circumstances of World War II and its immediate 
aftermath for the conditions to arise in which these long-present ideas of European 
cooperation and unity could move from the level of dreams to that of tentative and 
very partial realities.  Exactly how this happened is the subject of intense and detailed 
scholarly debate, too varied and rich wholly to capture here.
6
  But it is perhaps 
possible to identify a number of factors that helped bring this about. 
 One element is almost certainly the discrediting of the virulent nationalisms 
that had helped speed the descent into war.  Contrary to some of the first, slightly 
simplistic accounts, this did not mean that the leaders of postwar Europe despaired of 
the nation state itself.
7
  Rather the reverse in fact, as politicians across Britain and the 
continent pinned many of their hopes for postwar reconstruction, on the use of state 
power to plot the course of their recovery, to dampen the social tensions that had 
helped undermine democracy, and to rebuild a role for themselves in the recast 
international system.
8
  In this they enjoyed widespread popular support. But such faith 
in state power did not wholly blind many amongst Europe’s postwar political elite, or 
its wider population, to the realisation that individual states, acting in isolation, had 
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neither been able to avert the Great Depression nor halt the slide into World War II.  
The rebuilding of the individual nation states would thus have to be flanked with the 
construction of a new international order in which states would have to cooperate in 
order to preserve international prosperity and keep the peace.  Such an order might be 
universal and global – hence the hopes vested in the new structures of the United 
Nations Organisation.  But especially with the ever greater divide opening up between 
the Communist East and the capitalist West, a divide which significantly lowered the 
effectiveness of global and UN cooperation, it could also be regional and centred on 
the states of Western Europe.  Whichever grouping was chosen, however, it was 
widely accepted that one of the root causes of the interwar crisis had been the failure 
of international cooperation, and it was therefore vital that such mistakes not be 
repeated in the post-1945 period also. 
 Equally important in creating the conditions in which ideas of integration 
could flourish was the presence of a powerful, even existential, outside threat to each 
of the countries of Europe in the shape of the Soviet Union.  This danger was double 
headed, in as much as the presence of sizeable communist parties in many Western 
European states immediately after World War II, meant that the military threat from 
the Red Army was mirrored by the domestic threat of Communist electoral triumph.  
Both aspects of this menace however gave Europe an incentive to unite.  Militarily an 
army the size of Moscow’s could only be contained by multiple European states 
acting together (preferably with the US as well) rather than any single European 
power acting alone.  Cooperation and alliance was hence vital.  Furthermore Europe’s 
strategic vulnerability made all of the states of Western Europe highly conscious that 
were they to resume their internecine squabbling as they had after the First World 
War they were all too likely to find themselves sharing the fate of the countries of 
Eastern Europe.  Again structures would need to be built so as to prevent the type of 
fratricidal divisions that had beset Europe during the interwar period.  The domestic 
threat meanwhile not only helped encourage Europe’s non-Communist parties to 
come together to discuss their shared fears of far left, but also made many realise that 
the only truly effective way of neutralising the electoral appeal of Communism would 
be the delivery of a level of economic growth that would be hard for any individual 
country to sustain if acting entirely alone.  Economic cooperation would thus be a 
necessary ingredient in any long term defeat of Communism’s political challenge. 
 5 
 Another consequence of this outside threat was US enthusiasm for European 
unity.  One of the most striking features of the early European integration story is the 
importance of US sponsorship, encouragement, sometimes even downright bullying, 
in favour of greater integration.
9
  The very word itself, supposedly, was a US coinage, 
devised by a Marshall Planner who was told that his European audience did not like 
his repeated stress on European unity and hence reached for his thesaurus in order to 
find a word that meant the same thing as unity but sounded a little less frighteningly 
radical.
10
  Not all of this American persuasion proved wholly effective.  At times 
indeed US pressure for integration was counterproductive.  But viewed with hindsight 
I think it can be argued fairly conclusively that this US backing was a necessary if not 
sufficient condition for getting the integration process off the ground.  And this 
support only really made sense in a context where the US regarded European unity as 
a vital element in strengthening Europe in a context of increasingly polarised East-
West relations and establishing a partner in the incipient Cold War. 
 The combination of Soviet and US power also helped bring home to European 
elites how much the continent’s stock had fallen in world affairs.  Those who ruled 
Europe in the early postwar decades had all grown up in a continent that regarded 
itself, with some justification, as being at the very centre of global affairs.  The early 
postwar years were hence a rude awakening, as power shifted ever more clearly away 
from Europe and towards the two emerging Superpowers.  The fact that this same 
period also saw the increasingly rapid dissolution of Europe’s colonial empires further 
reinforced this acute sense of power loss.  As a result many turned to European unity 
as a mechanism that might lessen, if not reverse, this precipitous slide towards 
marginalisation in world affairs.
11
  Europe was used to mattering in world affairs and 
to being a subject, not an object of international diplomacy.  To recapture some of the 
continent’s lost centrality became a further reason for Europe’s political elite to 
explore ideas of integration and unity. 
 The third crucial factor was the need of European countries to reposition 
themselves vis-à-vis one another after the devastating impact of World War II.  This 
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was perhaps most obvious in the case of Italy and West Germany, both of whom 
perceived in integration, a means of rejoining the European family of nations after the 
disgrace of defeat and occupation.  For both countries, membership as equals with the 
French in a newly established European Community, was a major step towards re-
establishing respectability and throwing off their pariah status.  In both countries the 
political elite also believed that Europeanism would prove an ideal towards which 
their younger citizens could aspire, without reawakening the nationalist demons that 
had previously led to disaster.  And in both countries membership in a European 
entity would strengthen their tenuous hold on Western alignment.
12
  In Germany’s 
case, Westbindung as the policy became known, would guard against either a deal 
between the FRG’s allies and the Soviet Union in which Germany would be reunited 
in return for permanent neutrality, or, perhaps more likely for Konrad Adenauer, 
Germany’s first postwar Chancellor, a choice by some successive German 
government to strike a deal along these lines with Moscow.  A Germany firmly 
anchored to the West would be far less vulnerable to either eventuality.   For Italy 
meanwhile the danger lay within, in the form of the sizeable Communist and Socialist 
parties, both of which initially opposed any type of Western alignment.  Joining a 
strong and developing European entity, solidly Western in its orientation, would 
minimise the dangers of the Italians electing a government able to call into question 
the Italian choice of April 1948 to look West rather than East in the postwar world.  
But France too was arguably using integration to position itself, trading in its rapidly 
diminishing credit as one of the ‘victors’ of World War II in return for a set of 
European institutional arrangements designed to prevent the German threat, in 
particular, from disrupting its recovery and undermining its international position.
13
  
During the interwar period France had tried confrontation with a defeated neighbour 
and found itself cast, by world opinion, into the role of vindictive villain – a 
reputation which it had further weakened its position once Hitler came to power.  
After World War II its initial attempt to adopt an even tougher punitive stance had 
collided head on with the very different policy of Britain and America, both of whom 
were intent on rebuilding a strong Germany.  The emergence in 1949 of a potentially 
strong West German state was a stinging defeat for French postwar foreign policy. In 
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such circumstances integration offered a clever way of changing course, attracting 
praise from the US in particular for their new constructive stance, and gambling on 
partnership and reconciliation with the Federal Republic rather than a renewed 
confrontation that France was always likely to lose.  France alone couldn’t beat 
Germany; better then to join it.
14
 
 Such geo-political arguments in favour of unity were flanked with powerful 
economic motives.  As argued above, the basic economic interdependence of 
European economies was nothing new, although the amputation of the eastern third of 
Germany did mean that the new West German state was deprived of the agricultural 
heartlands from which it had previously fed itself.  This offered a valuable 
opportunity for major European exporters of agricultural goods like France and the 
Netherlands to take on the role once filled by Prussia.
15
  But the more fundamental 
change was the way in which, with the ever greater involvement of the state in the 
running of most European economies – a trend which had been encouraged by both 
World Wars but which continued into the postwar world as states embraced economic 
planning, nationalisation, and extensive state welfare - that awareness of European 
interdependence which had once been preserve of the private sector now became a 
reality of central concern to the state itself.  As a result, there was no repeat of the pre-
World War I situation in which the interdependence and interlinkages perceived by 
private sector industrialists were disregarded or deplored by politicians intent on 
national aggrandizement.  Instead the state now needed to act in ways that could 
address Europe’s underlying need for economic cooperation.  It was thus no 
coincidence that the single most identifiable clarion call for European action of the 
early postwar years came from that part of the French state in charge of planning the 
rebuilding of France, the Commissariat du Plan.
16
  As Milward observes, the scheme 
by Jean Monnet that led to unveiling of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, was none 
other than a device intended to salvage the Monnet Plan – i.e. the roadmap to French 
economic recovery drawn up by the head of the planning commissariat – and to 
prevent the programmed reconstruction of French heavy industry being disrupted if 
not destroyed by the reappearance of competition from German heavy industry.  
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Under the Schuman Plan European controls would take the place of the fast-
disappearing Occupying Powers’ controls on Germany industry and help prevent a 
free for all in the heavy industrial sector out of which Germany was always likely to 
emerge triumphant. One Monnet plan was thus intended to save the other.
17
  
 Finally it was necessary to devise a successful plan for integration.  Numerous 
different schemes and ideas were put forward in the first postwar decade, many of 
which failed to get off the drawing board, others of which never lived up to the high 
expectations that had surrounded their launch.  The ones that mattered though were 
those that managed to bring together a winning combination of purpose, timing, 
structure, and membership.  The Schuman Plan thus focused on an important sector 
characterised by both a longstanding rivalry between French and German industry, 
but also a short term crisis brought about by the imminent ending of allied controls on 
German production.
18
  It was launched at a time when the German government was 
weak enough still to be interested, and the French government strong enough to act, 
but already highly conscious of its dwindling leverage over its eastern neighbour.  The 
proposed institutions were powerful enough to do the job they were intended for 
(controlling heavy industry) and exciting enough to look like a real advance towards 
European unity, but limited in their scope and hence not unduly threatening to the 
core of national sovereignty.  And its membership was large enough to matter, but 
small enough for agreement to be feasible.  Crucially four countries joined France and 
Germany in establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), rendering 
their tense enforced cohabitation that much more tolerable, and giving some 
credibility to the rhetoric about ‘uniting Europe’, but the British did not take part, 
thereby cutting out of the picture a strong sceptic about the integration process with an 
established track record of watering down integration schemes.  The Six – France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – were almost the ideal 
grouping within which to launch a scheme of this nature. 
 In similar fashion the planned EEC had a central purpose, the liberalisation of 
European trade, useful enough and attractive enough to appeal to important 
constituencies within each of the participating states.
19
  But its structures also had 
enough development potential within them to attract to the cause those who wanted a 
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more political Europe and who had been downhearted by the 1954 failure of the 
putative European Defence Community (EDC).  The timing was also good, with the 
French government which had overseen the fall of the EDC no longer in office, but 
with the pro-European momentum that had built up behind the planned European 
army not having entirely dissipated.  The institutions shared plenty of DNA with those 
of the ECSC, but had had their supranationality substantially lessened, thereby 
reassuring some of those who had been concerned about the loss of sovereignty 
involved in the EDC.  And the membership was once again the winning formula of 
the Six.  The exclusion of Britain which had been a real problem in an institution with 
a military purpose like the EDC, not least because of the likelihood of Germany 
quickly becoming the dominant military player, mattered much less in a more 
economic entity like the EEC, and was certainly likely to make agreement about the 
institutional shape of the new Community that much easier. 
 
Enduring utility 
How though have institutions created over six decades ago been able to preserve their 
relevance over the ensuing years?  After all the exceptional circumstances that 
facilitated their birth – Germany’s temporary weakness and division, the Cold War, 
the internal left-wing threat within several European democracies, the vivid and still 
fresh legacy of World War II - have long since vanished.  Why then, have the 
European bodies that emerged in the immediate postwar period not vanished also?  
This is all the more so given the multiple other ways in which Europe and the 
European Community/Union has evolved and developed over the sixty plus years in 
which it has been in existence.  There are many factors likely to have been responsible 
for the longevity and success of the EC/EU, but this overview will highlight the three 
most important: value, adaptability and openness. 
 The first key reason why the EC/EU has gone on being relevant is the 
enduring value of its core activity, namely the establishment and maintenance of trade 
liberalisation within Europe.  This task has had the huge merit of being attractive to 
governments and companies alike, almost attainable, but also never complete.  The 
initial dismantlement of tariff barriers amongst the EC founder members, a task 
successfully concluded by 1967, has thus had to be followed up by the negotiation 
and defence of the Community/Union’s trade profile vis-à-vis third countries, by the 
policing of competition and other rules within the customs union, by the 
 10 
establishment of specialised policies, like the CAP for those parts of the economy 
unable simply to liberalise in the fashion expected of most industry, and, since the 
mid-1980s in particular, by a determined effort to rid the Single Market of those 
various non-tariff barriers that had partially undone the trade liberalisation efforts of 
the formative decades.  It has also had powerful knock-on effects on other policy 
areas.  Both the renewed emphasis on the establishment of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the emergence of what has become the Justice and Home Affairs 
pillar of the Union’s activity, were closely linked to the mid-1980s drive to abolish 
the remaining barriers within a European Single Market.
20
 The core goal aspired to – 
a target that is often approached, but never quite attained – namely barrier free trade 
within a large and prosperous European market, is one that has continued to exercise a 
strong appeal, thereby helping to win the ongoing allegiance of the member states of 
EC/EU, to turn the Community/Union into an important player in international 
commercial discussions, and to exercise a powerful magnetic pull upon all of those 
states that have found themselves geographically close to, but just outside of the 
integrating Europe.  The risks of cutting oneself off from this large market continue, 
moreover, to act as a powerful disincentive to any state disillusioned with the 
integration process to withdraw from the Community/Union – as the current debate 
about Brexit within the United Kingdom clearly illustrates.  The enduring utility of 
the intra-European liberalisation process first sketched out by the Beyen Plan of the 
early 1950s, has thus continued to play a key role in making the Community/Union 
worthwhile belonging to and dangerous to leave over half a century later. 
 Equally important however has been the ability of the EC/EU to also adapt 
itself to other tasks, in addition to trade liberalisation.  The Treaty of Rome, the 
founding document of the EEC, was remarkably short about the specifics of what the 
Community that it brought into being would do.  Some policy areas, like the 
establishment of a Customs Union, were set out in some detail; others, like an 
agricultural policy, were sketched in much more cursory fashion; and still others, like 
environmental policy, which today loom quite large in the activities of the EU, were 
not mentioned at all.  This did not matter, however, since the Treaty was what the 
French call a traité cadre, a framework treaty, which set up an institutional system 
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without necessarily prescribing exactly what such institutions would do.  The exact 
nature of the Treaty’s endpoint was never spelled out.  The famous objective referred 
to in the preamble, ‘an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe’, is, if one thinks 
about it, as vague and as unspecific as it is potentially inspiring.  This was quite 
deliberate.  In the short term it allowed a broad coalition to rally behind the original 
EEC scheme, ranging from those who were merely interested in trade liberalisation 
and nothing more, to those who had little interest in commercial matters, but instead 
regarded the new document as a high road leading rapidly to a fully fledged European 
federation – not to mention many others with viewpoints somewhere between these 
two extremes.  But it has been equally important in the longer term, since the 
flexibility of the basic framework has allowed it to serve any number of policy goals 
and tasks that were unimagined by the founders.  Monetary integration, wealth 
redistribution from the richer regions of the EC/EU to the poorer, foreign policy 
coordination, joint discussion of immigration, the funding of scientific research, or the 
establishment of student mobility schemes like Erasmus – the list of policy areas that 
the EU is now involved with that were barely referred to in the founding treaties is so 
long as to almost defy enumeration. Rather than being a precise instrument, carefully 
calibrated to execute one precisely defined task – and hence liable to become 
redundant once that task was complete – the Community/Union is instead like a Swiss 
Army knife, a multi-purpose tool capable of being used for any number of policy 
operations, many of which had never been contemplated by those who drafted the 
initial treaty text. 
 Another facet of this adaptability/flexibility has been the way in which the 
institutional system has been able to evolve, often without formal treaty change, so as 
to adapt itself to changing realities.  The core institutional shape sketched out by the 
Treaty of Rome, with its four key institutions, the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, and its basic 
method of establishing a corpus of European law, drawn up collaboratively by all of 
those taking part, but binding upon all of those who entered the system, have retained 
a degree of validity throughout the years since 1958.  But alongside such constancy 
there has also been a huge amount of flux, whether in the manner in which these 
institutions operate, or even in the fundamental architecture of the system.  The rise 
from the mid-1970s of the European Council, a body not foreseen in the original 
 12 
treaties, but now arguably at the very core of the Union, is an obvious case in point.
21
  
As a result, the Community/Union has been able to cope with a vast increase in the 
number of policy areas that it deals with, a massive expansion in the quantity and 
complexity of law-making and decision-taking that is required to carry out, and 
prodigious rise in the number of participating member states.  Had the basic 
mechanisms been less flexible, such a degree of change, would most likely have 
overwhelmed the system entirely.  Instead it has been able to adapt, messily certainly, 
and often slightly more slowly than it ought to have done, but in a fashion that has 
allowed it not only to survive but more importantly to do almost incalculably more 
than the small, six nation customs union originally established in 1958.   
Third, the structures designed to cope with a relatively simple six member 
state Community in the late 1950s, have had the merit of being open to the 
membership of many more countries.  Enlargement has never been easy.  On the 
contrary, on every occasion that an expansion of the EC/EU has been contemplated, 
there have been many on the inside of the Community/Union who have regarded the 
prospect with ill-disguised dismay, predicting dire economic, political and 
institutional consequences.  The idea of a trade off between ‘deepening’ and 
‘widening’ – between the furthering of integration and the extension of the EC/EU to 
include new member states – has become so well established in writing about the 
European integration process as to become almost a cliché.  And after each round of 
expansion there have been many who have attributed all of the subsequent difficulties 
encountered by the Community/Union to the negative consequences of undue 
enlargement.  Despite this, however, the EC/EU has gone on expanding, from six to 
nine, from nine to ten and then twelve, from twelve to fifteen, from fifteen to twenty 
five, and most recently from twenty five to twenty seven and twenty seven to twenty 
eight. Widening has thus become as constant a feature of the integration process, as 
deepening itself, with barely a year in the Community/Union’s history identifiable 
when it has not been an imminent prospect, or a recently achieved reality, or 
sometimes indeed both at once.  Nor, contrary to general belief, has this geographical 
growth been as destructive as the Cassandras have predicted.  Rather the reverse 
indeed, with new member states often bringing new policy priorities and new 
perspectives into the integration process, thereby encouraging rather than 
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discouraging new initiatives.  The growth of redistributive policies, such as the 
structural or cohesion funds, for example, is very clearly attributable to the first and 
second enlargements which brought into the Community fold a number of countries 
like Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal which were significantly poorer than most of 
the founder members and hence required sizeable resource transfers in order to be 
able to cope with closer economic integration.  More fundamentally still the increase 
in size of the Community/Union has played a key role in ensuring that it remains 
attractive and appealing to those already inside of it, as well as relevant in 
international discussions in a world ever more obsessed with huge entities like China 
or India.  Would Germany be content were it still confined to a small European 
Community of six member states?  And would the idea that the EC/EU really 
represented ‘Europe’ as a whole be at all credible were its membership still restricted 
to the six Western European states that set it up?  That the answers to both questions 
are so obvious is a strong illustration of how openness to new members has been a 
third crucial feature in preserving the vitality and relevance of the EC/EU in the six 
decades since its creation. 
 
Outside applicability 
Do any of these reflections have a wider applicability than Europe?  Or to put it 
another way, are the factors outlined above to explain how Europe chose the path of 
integration and the reasons that it has opted to remain on this path ever since, of any 
relevance to other parts of the world that might be tempted to experiment with 
regional integration or cooperation?  There are many reasons to be highly tentative in 
making any such suggestions, not least the deeply unsatisfactory nature of the 
parallels frequently drawn between the integration process in Europe and the 
establishment of earlier federal systems such as the United States.  Few of these 
enlighten; many mislead. The specificities of any particular region and the challenges 
that it faces in establishing the structures for regional cooperation are always likely to 
exceed the clear resemblances with what has happened and is still happening within 
Europe.  But for what they are worth, this chapter will very cautiously advance five 
ideas derived from the European experience that might be of some utility to other 
parts of the world as they too grapple with the challenges of regional integration. 
 The first would be to underline the lack of automaticity between the objective 
need for integration and its realisation.  Interwar Europe needed to integrate as much 
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if not more than postwar Europe.  And yet despite both the political and economic 
incentives to follow this course, not to mention the presence of multiple plans and 
schemes designed to encourage just such a development, no such integration 
occurred.  Instead, Europe became more divided rather than less and ultimately 
descended into the destructive chaos of World War II.  This might suggest that in 
other regions too, it will not be sufficient merely to discern a need to increase regional 
cooperation; instead, a huge degree of political will is required in order to overcome 
the very basic reluctance of all nation states to relinquish any portion of their 
sovereignty or national independence. 
 Second the European example would suggest that a multiplicity of different 
incentives to integrate is a strength rather than a weakness.  In Europe at least there 
was no single reason why the integration process began.  Instead different actors 
perceived different incentives at different times.  But rather than being a problem, this 
was actually central to the success of the integration process.  As argued above, it was 
the very breadth of the EEC’s appeal, its ability to attract the hopes of very diverse 
groupings, seeking seemingly divergent outcomes, that helped not only get the project 
off the ground but has also helped sustain it ever since.  Needless to say such 
underlying differences of opinion have periodically resulted in sharp internal 
disagreements.  This in part explains why the history of European integration is so 
littered with crisis and dispute.
22
  And yet it has in many ways been the sheer variety 
of hopes vested in the integration project that has helped keep it going and ensured 
that it still retains a relevance and a utility decades after its original inception. 
 Third, the competition between multiple institutional visions has also been an 
advantage rather than a disadvantage.  One of the features of postwar Europe was the 
huge proliferation of competing cooperative schemes.  Many rose and fell with great 
rapidity.  Others lingered on, never quite fulfilling the hopes of those who had 
founded them, but with too much utility, or too much symbolic value, to be allowed to 
die.
23
  And still others persisted in near complete obscurity, performing helpful even 
vital functional tasks, but in a manner known only to a tiny minority of sectoral 
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  This dense institutional landscape was a help rather than a hindrance to the 
early integration process however.  For a start, successive institutions could learn 
from the institutional features, both positive and negative, of earlier structures.  The 
nascent EEC for instance quite consciously sought to avoid some of the weaknesses 
that had beset its predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC).  Second, the almost Darwinian competition between different structures 
helped ensure that only the most suitable flourished.  And third the presence of other 
international bodies relieved the fledgling Community institutions from trying to do 
too much, too soon.  Neither monetary cooperation nor foreign policy cooperation 
needed to be handled by the Community during its first decade of operation for 
instance, because the former was the preserve of the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
second that of NATO.
25
 
 Fourth the European example also suggests that there can be significant 
advantages in starting small in terms of membership.  An EU of 27 does now operate 
reasonably effectively, despite the lamentations of those nostalgic for the smaller, 
sleaker, entity of 12 or 15.  But a Community so large would have been unlikely to 
have got off the ground in the 1950s or 1960s.  Far better instead to have begun with 
few member states – and few policy tasks – and to have learned to cope with both 
widening and deepening as time went on.  The fledgling EEC thus benefited both 
from the reality of the Cold War that made membership inconceivable not just for the 
many states trapped behind the Iron Curtain but also for countries like Sweden, 
Finland or Austria that were neutrals in the East-West conflict, and from the initial 
choice Britain or Denmark to remain on the sidelines.  It might well therefore be the 
case that elsewhere too, successful regional integration need not initially involve all of 
those states that might potentially be included.  Instead starting small can help lessen 
the initial challenge and make success more realistic.  Then, if the process works, 
others can join in at a later stage. 
 Fifth and finally, the recent difficulties of the EC/EU underline the importance 
of winning and preserving the support of the wider population for regional 
cooperation.  The fragility of the EU’s hold on popular consent could be seen as its 
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greatest historical weakness.  The gap between the European ideas of those who 
govern Europe and those who are governed has arisen for reasons that are fairly 
comprehensible.  The structures of the Community/Union are both baffling and 
distant from the lives of most Europeans.  There has also been a recurrent temptation 
for all national politicians, to claim for themselves credit for all the gains that 
integration has brought, while blaming the EC/EU for all the negative consequences 
of closer cooperation.  And it is easier, and in the short term attractive, for politicians 
and to some extent the media to continue to talk to national populations about 
European politics in a way that emphasises national autonomy and freedom of 
manoeuvre, rather than fully acknowledging the extent to which all of the EC/EU 
member states are dependent on cooperation with each other.  But whatever the 
reasons behind it, this failure fully to educate most Europeans about the realities of 
the integration process has already become an important check on the integration 
process – witness the periodic negative outcomes of referendums – and seems likely 
to cause future difficulties ahead.  It is therefore an error that any other regional 
cooperative project would be well advised to learn from and avoid. 
 Quite how applicable any of these insights are to other regions of the world, 
and more specifically to Africa, is a judgment I feel little qualified to make.  What is 
worth stressing by way of conclusion is the way in which European integration 
reflects a series of underlying realities about the continent, but was only able to begin 
thanks to a particular set of circumstances that arose in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II.  Crucial amongst these was the discrediting of extreme nationalism, the 
presence of a serious outside threat, the need for several European countries to 
rehabilitate and reposition themselves after the trauma of wartime defeat and 
occupation, and the greater governmental awareness of economic interdependence 
that arose out of increased state involvement in national economies.  Once started, the 
integration process has then been sustained by the continuing relevance and value of 
its core liberalising task, the flexibility of its policy remit and its institutional structure 
which have been able to adapt to shifting reality and take on a vast array of policy 
tasks never dreamt of by its founders, and its openness to membership applications 
from a huge number of neighbouring states.  A process that began with limited 
cooperation amongst just six countries in the production and distribution of coal and 
steel, has thus evolved into the hugely complicated and complex structure of today’s 
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EU.  This certainly matters for Europe; whether it matters also for other regions, and 
has any lessons to teach, is an issue I shall leave to others to determine. 
  
 
  
